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This paper explores the effects of monetary shocks on the allocation of factors of
production.  We analyze these effects when money plays a role in improving the timing of the
transactions undertaken by entrepreneurs.  Such improvement is facilitated by money’s important
role in providing liquidity to entrepreneurs.  Using a model in which production processes take
time to mature and where credit contracts are not enforceable, we show the consequences of
monetary shocks for the allocation of resources and the real business cycle.  Our analysis reveals
that such shocks disrupt the allocation of resources with important effects on total factor
productivity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, United States firms held on average 36 percent of M1
1.  This fact suggests that
money balances are an important element of firms’ production process.  The present paper
explores the effects of monetary shocks on the allocation of factors of production.  In particular,
we analyze these effects when money plays a role in improving the timing of the transactions
undertaken by entrepreneurs.  Such improvement is facilitated by money’s important role in
providing liquidity to the entrepreneurs.  In the absence of liquidity, firms have to either time
their expenditures to coincide with their income or invest in assets associated with transactions
costs that are significantly high for short holding periods.  Monetary injections tend to disrupt
this liquidity function of money since the extra liquidity that they provide is not proportional to
previous holdings of money and they are not distributed to entrepreneurs with the best
investment opportunities.  This disruption is likely to occur, in particular, in countries where
access to credit is linked to political affiliation and friendship connections.  To a lesser extent,
such phenomena are also witnessed in the United States where monetary contractions dry the
liquidity of small firms in a much larger proportion than large firms.  The heterogeneous effects
of monetary tightness on firms of varying sizes has been documented and analyzed by Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994).  The aim of this paper is to introduce a simple model to analyze the
                                                                
1This estimate is calculated from the Federal Reserves’ Flow of Funds, September 1999, as the
percentage of total checkable deposits and currency held by non-financial businesses (which
includes non-farm non-financial commercial businesses, non-farm non-corporate businesses and
farm businesses).  The average reported here corresponds to the average of the four quarters of
1998.  The average percentage for the first two quarters of 1999 is 38%.2
dynamic effects of monetary injections when money provides a liquidity service to entrepreneurs
while abstracting from credit markets and heterogeneously sized firms.
Our model builds on Woodford (1990) along similar lines to Faig (1998).  Production
projects take time to mature and different economically productive activities overlap in their
timing.  In other words, only a portion of projects yields output in each period.  Furthermore,
entrepreneurs can participate in, at most, one project at a time.  As in Lucas (1980), these agents
have no recourse to credit because credit contracts cannot be enforced.  In such an environment,
earnings from projects currently yielding output easily contribute to financing those
entrepreneurs’ consumption and investment expenditures.  Meanwhile, entrepreneurs who cannot
rely on earnings from projects not yet matured require another source of liquidity to finance their
expenditures.  Such asymmetric opportunities for self-financing motivates the need for money in
our model.  That is, once entrepreneurs receive output from their projects, they sell a portion of it
for money, which is consequently used to consume and invest in periods when projects are not
yet matured.
Our model departs from Woodford (1990) in that production projects take time to mature
and thus production activities overlap.  The overlapping structure is adopted in order to easily
endogenize the presence of entrepreneurs with different marginal rates of return on their
investments, and hence money’s important role in the allocation of the factors of production.
The major difference from our model and Faig (1998) is the introduction of workers supplying
labor to the entrepreneurs.  This characterization allows us to extend the analysis of monetary
shocks to their effects on real wages and employment.  Moreover, the inclusion of a labor force
in the model provides a realistic tone in which it is no longer necessary to assume that monetary3
balances in the economy are uniquely held by entrepreneurs.
Our model contributes to the limited participation literature that stresses the liquidity role
of money and the real effects of the relocations of liquidity that follow monetary injections.
Seminal contributions to this literature are those of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg
(1984).  However, in these models money is only held by households and thus has no direct role
in financing purchases of productive inputs.  Lucas(1990), Fuerst(1992) and the long literature
following them augmented the framework by incorporating this financing role of money.
Nonetheless, these models still rely on the existence of a representative firm and are
consequently mute with respect to the effects of monetary injections on the allocation of
productive resources across alternative projects.  Additionally, for the purpose of tractability,
these models adopt a family structure in which wealth is occasionally shared by all its members,
while at other times, monetary holdings cannot be transferred from one household member to
another.  With this family structure, tractability is gained at the expense of eliminating long
lasting dynamic effects, at least without ad-hoc costs of adjusting cash balances as in Christiano
and Eichembaum (1992).  In our model, this split family device is not necessary.
The role of money in providing liquidity to entrepreneurs in order to improve the timing
of their transactions is easily captured in the overlapping production structure adopted in this
paper.  In the present setup, we find that monetary injections introduced through entrepreneurs at
the stage of acquiring money momentarily depress the real rate of interest by increasing expected
inflation.   These injections lead with some delays to increases of output, employment, and real
wages.  The increases, however, tend to worsen the allocation of resources in the market
production sector because they shift resources from entrepreneurs with the best investment4
opportunities to the entrepreneurs that receive the monetary injection. Also, monetary injections
generate long lasting dynamic effects not only because of the wealth effects present in Grossman
and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), but also because of the relocations of resources across
alternative long lasting projects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the model and
the overlapping production structure of the model economy.  This section also defines the
recursive monetary competitive equilibrium.  Section 3 characterizes optimal individual behavior
and the Euler equations relating to the individuals’ decision process.  Section 4 constructs the
steady state that the economy would reach in the absence of shocks.  Section 5 analyzes the
stochastic dynamics around the steady state when the economy is subjected to monetary shocks.
Section 6 provides a numerical evaluation of the stochastic dynamics following a one-time shock
to the money supply.  Finally, section 7 concludes and reiterates the main findings of the paper.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
The present model describes a closed economy with two types of individuals: workers
and entrepreneurs.  Workers are not endowed with technology to produce for the market and they
supply labor, which is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors.  Each entrepreneur owns
the technology for a market production process and manages the firm using this technology.
Because credit contracts cannot be enforced, entrepreneurs also own the capital invested in their
firms.   Financing a portion of the capital stock with credit, such as fixed capital, does not
drastically change the model.  However, the assumption that some portion of the resources
invested in their firms must be self-financed is crucial and replaces the customary cash-in-5
advance constraint.
The model economy is characterized by two sectors with overlapping production
processes.  Production in each sector requires two periods in which labor and materials are
employed to later yield output in the third period.  The two sectors are identical except in the
timing of their production process.  In each period, one of the two sectors collects the output
from a completed production process and  starts the first stage of the next.  Simultaneously, the
other sector is in the second stage of a production process that will yield output one period later.
We distinguish between two types of capital in either sector: circulating and fixed capital.  While
the former is used to finance labor and materials, the latter is exogenously determined.  This
simplification, made for analytical convenience, is supported by the fact that fixed capital
depreciates slowly and thus fluctuates little over the business cycle.
For ease of exposition, we further assume that each sector is comprised of a
representative firm managed by a representative entrepreneur.  This would be the case if, for
example, all entrepreneurs in a particular sector were identical.  Each representative entity is
endowed with the following technology:








where yt = output in period t;
F = production function;
k = fixed capital;
xt
i = materials employed in period t at stage of production i (i = 1 and 2); and
nt
i = labor employed in period t at stage of production i (i = 1 and 2).6
The function F is increasing in all arguments, concave, continuously differentiable, and linearly
homogeneous, satisfying the Inada conditions for interior solutions.
During the first stage of production, an entrepreneur starts with a certain amount of liquid
wealth comprised of the output just obtained and the real money balances carried from the
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where at
i = liquid wealth in period t at stage i of production (i = 1 and 2);
Mt
i = money acquired in period t at stage of production i (i = 1 and 2);
D t
i  = money received in period t at stage of production i (i = 1 and 2); and
 pt = price of output in period t.
In the first stage of production, liquid wealth is allocated to consumption, real money
balances, and circulating capital.  Since the entrepreneur purchases materials and hires labor with
the circulating capital, the budget constraint faced by the entrepreneur in the first stage of
production takes the following form:
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where ct
i = consumption in period t at stage i of production (i = 1 and 2);
 wt = wage rate in period t.
During the second stage of production, the liquid wealth of an entrepreneur is comprised7
of the monetary balances acquired in the first stage of production and any lump-sum monetary
transfers received:
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This liquid wealth is used to purchase consumption, materials, labor, and possibly to carry
forward some money balances to the next period.  Therefore, the budget constraint faced by the
entrepreneur in the second stage of production is represented as follows:
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All the demand components in (3)  and (5) must be non-negative.
Workers do not own any technology to produce for the market. Instead, they are endowed
with time and a home production technology.  Workers’ time can be sold in the market as labor
or can be directly employed in home production.  For ease of exposition, we also assume the
existence of a representative worker. The home production technology for this worker is
specified as follows:
(6) c G T n t
h
t
s = ( , );
where ct
h = home production in period t, consumed directly by the representative worker;
G = home production function;
T = total time available; and
nt
s= supply of labor in period t.
The function G is assumed to be increasing with T, decreasing with  nt
s, strictly concave,8
and continuously differentiable and satisfies the Inada condition for an interior solution of  nt
s.




































n = consumption in period t;
Mt
n = money acquired in period t by the representative worker; and
D t
n = money received in period t by the representative worker.
All demands in (6) must be nonnegative. The two types of consumption, c c t
h
t
n  and  , are perfect
substitutes.
The preferences of all individuals are represented by the following utility function:










where U = felicity function; and
b = subjective discount factor.
The function U is increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable. Furthermore, it satisfies
the Inada conditions for an interior solution.
In addition, there is a government in the economy that manages the money supply.  The
monetary injections,  D D D t t t
n 1 2 , , and  , introduced by this government are stochastic variables9
which can take positive (transfers) or negative (taxes) values.  In either case, they are seen as
lump sum by each recipient.  The stochastic processes followed by the monetary injections vary
depending on the simulations, and will be specified in sections 5 and 6.
We assume the equilibria in the economy to be monetary and competitive.  In other
words, the sequences of allocations and prices must be consistent with the following conditions:
individuals take prices as given and behave according to rational expectations, workers maximize
(9) subject to (6) and (7), entrepreneurs maximize (9) subject to (1) through (5), money is valued,
and all markets clear.  In addition, the equilibria studied in this paper are recursive in sense that
prices are a function of the state variables of the economy.  These state variables include present
harvest, labor and materials invested in the previous period at stage 1 of production, total money
holdings after the monetary injections, and all variables useful to forecast future monetary
injections.
There are three markets in this economy: output, labor, and money.  The respective
market clearing conditions are given by the following equations:
(10) c c x x y t t t t t
1 2 1 2 + + + = ;
(11)    n n n t
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3. OPTIMAL INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
This section describes the optimal behavior of workers and entrepreneurs.  When10
entrepreneurs behave optimally, their consumption, investment, and portfolio choices satisfy the
standard Euler conditions.  For assets held in positive amounts, a unit of output brings the same
utility whether immediately consumed or sold for one of these assets and then the gross return
consumed at maturity.  For assets with a binding non-negativity constraint, a unit of output brings
more utility to the entrepreneur if it is immediately consumed than sold for one of these assets.
Algebraically, these Euler conditions are formalized with the following relations:
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The Inada conditions assumed for U  and F imply that consumption and investment in
labor and materials at both stages of production are always positive, so that the demand for
money at stage 1 of production is ensured to be positive.  As a result, conditions (13) and (15) to
(18) do not contemplate the possibility of corner solutions.  However, condition (14) considers a
possible corner solution because the demand for money at stage 2 of production may be zero.11
When workers behave optimally, their consumption, labor supply, and money demand
must satisfy the following first order conditions:











































Condition (19) is analogous to the entrepreneurs' Euler relations (12) and (13).  Condition (20)
establishes that the worker must obtain, at the margin, the same return by either supplying a unit
of labor in the market or by employing it in home production.
In general, the optimal policy functions for workers and entrepreneurs depend on the
individual state variables that characterize their wealth and liquidity.  For entrepreneurs, the state
variables are at
1 at stage 1, and x n a t t t - - 1
1
1
1 2 , ,    and   at stage 2.  The unique state variable relevant to







- + 1 D .  In addition, the optimal policy functions depend on current prices and
monetary injections, together with other variables useful in predicting future prices and monetary
injections.
4. THE STEADY STATE
In the absence of monetary injections, the present model is deterministic.  In this case, an
equilibrium converges to a steady state where output, its allocation, and prices are constant.  This
steady state solves the deterministic counterparts of (13) to (20) together with (1) to (12) with the12
time subscripts omitted from all the variables.
2  This section characterizes the properties of this
steady state important in order to understand the neighboring stochastic dynamics, which are
studied in the next section.
In the steady state, workers do not hold money because its gross real return is unity
(prices are constant) and their subjective discount factor is less than one, so that condition (18)
holds with strict inequality.  Likewise, money is demanded by entrepreneurs only to provide
liquidity at stage 2 because (13) implies c c
1 2 >  and thus condition (14) must hold with strict
inequality.  Consequently, money is only demanded by entrepreneurs at stage 1 of production to
provide liquidity at stage 2.
In the steady state, conditions (15) and (16) imply that the real return of circulating
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per period).  Meanwhile, conditions (17) and (18), together with (13), imply that the real return
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period.  Consequently, circulating capital invested in either stage of production dominates money
                                                                
2The existence of a solution for this system of equations is easily proved using the standard
techniques used to prove existence of a steady state in the Neoclassical growth model. Similarly,
techniques analogous to those used in the analysis of the Neoclassical growth model can then be
used to prove uniqueness and convergence. An explicit solution of the steady state and the
deterministic dynamics around it exists if U is logarithmic and F is Cobb-Douglas.13
in rate of return (ß
 -2 and ß
 -1 versus 1).  Moreover, circulating capital invested at stage 2 earns a
higher return per period than circulating capital invested at stage 1.  Hence, the allocation of
labor and materials, purchased with circulating capital, is inefficient: too much circulating capital
is invested at stage 1 of production when its return is low and too little at stage 2 when its return
is high.  For this reason, monetary shocks that increase the liquidity available to entrepreneurs at
stage 2 of production improve the allocation of labor and materials, hence increasing total factor
productivity.  Vice versa, monetary shocks that reduce liquidity at stage 2 worsen the allocation
of labor and materials, resulting in reduced total factor productivity.
Similar properties characterize the steady state of economies with a growing money
supply at a constant rate.  In the present case, prices grow over time at the rate of growth of the
money supply.  Consequently, the gross return on money is equated to the inverse of the gross
rate of growth of the money supply.  Efficiency in the allocation of labor and materials is
inversely related to the rate of growth of the money supply.  An efficient allocation can be
achieved following Friedman's (1969) optimum quantity of money rule, that is, with a steady
decline of the money supply consistent with a gross return on money equal to ß
 -1.  In this case,
the rates of return on money and circulating capital at both stages of production are equalized.  In
this paper, we study equilibria in which the government does not pursue the optimum quantity of
money rule.
5. STOCHASTIC DYNAMICS
We now turn to the study of the economy's reaction to stochastic monetary injections.  To
this end, the model adopts the following specialized functional forms: the felicity function U is14
assumed to be logarithmic, the production function F is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, and the
home production function G is assumed to have a special form that yields an isoelastic labor
supply:
(21) U c c t t ( ) ln = ,
(22) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) y k x n x n t t t t t
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where  ai = income share of factor i  ( ) i k x n x n = , , , ,
1 1 2 2 , and
2 = elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the real wage.
The monetary injections are assumed to be sufficiently small so that the economy remains at an
equilibrium around the steady state characterized in the previous section.  In this equilibrium,
money is a dominated asset in rate of return and thus is only demanded by workers because of
the cash in advance constraint and to provide liquidity services to entrepreneurs at their second
stage of production.
The effect of monetary injections depends crucially on whom money is handed to or
taken away from.  We assume that money is handed to (or taken from) entrepreneurs at their first
stage of production.  This assumption follows the large literature on liquidity effects where
monetary injections are only received by entrepreneurs in the process of acquiring money.
Specifically, monetary injections have the following form:
(24) D t t t t y p
1 = g ;
where gt is a stochastic variable that follows a Markov process.  Notice that even if the monetary15
injection is proportional to the entrepreneurs’ nominal wealth at their first stage of production, it
is handed in a lump-sum manner to each one of them.
With these functional forms, we conjecture that the optimal policy functions for
entrepreneurs have the following form:







1 = = = ~( ) , ~( ) , ~( ) / , g g g       M m a p t t t t
1
1
1 = ~ ( ) , g







2 2 0 = = = = ~ ( ) , ~ ( ) , ~ ( ) / , g g g      and   .
These policy functions together with (2), (4), (24) and (25) imply:
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To prove our conjecture about the policy functions, we check that these functions satisfy
the entrepreneurs’ budget equations and the first order Euler conditions for utility maximization.
This verification is done by directly inserting (26) into equations (1) to (5) and (13) to (18).
After simplification using (29), (30), and the partial derivatives of (22), we obtain the following
system of functional equations:
(28) ~( ) ~( ) ~( ) ~ ( ) c x n m t t t t 1 1 1 1 1 g g g g + + + = ,
(29)        
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This system determines the functions: ~( ), ~ ( ), ~( ), ~ ( ), ~ ( ), ~ ( ), c c x x n n t t t t t t 1 2 1 2 1 2 g g g g g g            and  ~ ( ) m t 1 g .
While, in general, there does not exist an explicit analytical solution, these functions can easily
be computed with standard numerical algorithms.
To complete the description of an equilibrium, we use the market clearing conditions and
the workers' optimal behavior.  Let µt be the proportion of the money supply held by
entrepreneurs at stage 2 of production after the monetary injection.  The market clearing
condition for money implies:
(35) [ ] a
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Rearranging,
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Since the representative worker is at a corner solution with respect to money holdings, the budget
constraint of the representative worker (7) implies that ct
n is also a function of  g m t t t a ,   and 
1.
The price level pt follows from the equilibrium in the money market and the equation relating the
effects of injections in the money supply:
(39) [ ] M m a n a n a p t
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The previous two paragraphs describe how all real endogenous variables at time t are
functions of  g m t t t a ,   and 
1.  First, the variable at
1 is equal to predetermined output yt.  Second, the
proportion µt is determined by the initial money holdings and the monetary shock:
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Finally, the monetary shock gt follows an exogenous Markov process.  Hence, the
equilibrium amounts of inputs are a function of yt, µt, and gt.  Given the production function (22),
present output depends on the previous two period inputs, which in turn depend on yt-1, yt-2, gt-1,
gt-2, µt-1, and µt-2.  Consequently, the law of motion of output is a difference equation where yt
depends on  yt-1, yt-2, gt-1, gt-2, µt-1, and µ t-2.
6. NUMERICAL EVALUATION18
This section evaluates the stochastic dynamics of the model around the steady state.  The
parameters used are the following: b = 1.02
-1 , q = 1, and ai = 0.2 for all i.  The rate of time
preference (b) is chosen so as to be consistent with an annual steady state rate of return on capital
of 8 percent.  Although the wage elasticity of labor supply (2) adopts a higher value in our
parametrization than estimated by microeconomic analyses of labour, we opt for an intermediate
value which is lower than values typically used in the real business cycle literature.  The shares
of output accruing to the various factors of production (ai) chosen in the present analysis are
consistent with a scenario in which 40 percent accrues to materials, one third of the remaining 60
percent to physical capital and the balance to labor.
Furthermore, we adopt a simple stochastic environment in which it is assumed that the
shocks to the money supply are identically and independently distributed and are exogenous to
the agents’ decision process.  In particular, we posit that there exist two possible states of the
world, normal and abnormal, where each occurs with probability 0.9 and 0.1, respectively.  Each
state is characterized by a different rate of change in the monetary supply: in the normal state, the
stock of money increases by 0.01 and in the abnormal state, it increases by 0.02.
Figures 1 to 6 display the impulse response functions generated by a simulation in which
the model economy experiences one period of the abnormal state after a long sequence of normal
periods.  Monetary injections are distributed to entrepreneurs in the first stage of production. The
first stage entrepreneurs, with no monetary holdings at the beginning of the period, are in the
process of acquiring money.  The money they receive from the monetary injection is not spent19
until the next period.  As a result of the monetary injection, factors of production are shifted from
household production and second stage production to first stage production.  Indeed, we observe
from Figures 5 and 6 that both labor and materials used by the first stage entrepreneurs increase
in the period coincident with the increase in the money stock. These increases overwhelm the
declines of labor and materials used by the second stage entrepreneurs. Hence, the demand for
labour experiences a net increase, which is reflected by an associated increase in the real wage
rate.  The increase in the demand for labor in stage one production is reflected by the increase in
the real wage in Figure 4.  Comparing the movement in the real wage to the movement in total
product in Figure3, we find that real wages are quite procyclical except for the period
immediately after the shock.  Figure 3 also maps the response of consumption to the monetary
injection.  In fact, movements in total consumption follows movements in total product very
closely, except in the period of the monetary injection.  This gap is due to the fact that output
brought to the market in the injection period is unresponsive to the injection itself, unlike
consumption, as it has been determined in the two previous periods.  Although the injection
period real wage has increased, the initial drop in total consumption is attributed to the
entrepreneurs’ reduced purchasing power in response to the increase in prices as depicted in
Figure 2.
Meanwhile, the diversion of productive resources to the first stage of production leads to
a drop in the resources used in this period’s second stage production.  It is precisely this shift in
the allocation of resources which leads to a productive inefficiency since the entrepreneurs with
the best opportunities (those at the second stage of production) are adversely affected by the
monetary injections.  Consequently, since second stage production is reduced by the diversion of
resources from the second to the first stage entrepreneurs, the total output of the model economy20
experiences a drop in the period immediately following the monetary injection.  Nonetheless,
since the first stage production process increases the use of  labor and materials, the second
period after the monetary injection experiences a large increase in production
3.
Important in the dynamic effects of the monetary injections is the relationship between
the money supply and prices.  Figure 2 shows that the increase in inflation is smaller than the
increase in the money supply.  The immediate result is that real money balances increase.
However, this increase is far from equally distributed.  The entrepreneurs at the first stage of
production receive all the additional money balances, while entrepreneurs at the second stage of
production and workers see the value of their money balances erode with the price hike.  This
redistribution of liquidity is the source of the redistribution of resources after the injection.
As a result of the monetary injection the relative size of the two sectors of production is
altered.  The sector managed by the entrepreneurs that received the injection becomes large
relative to the other sector.  This imbalance persists for a few periods because the entrepreneurs
with more output have also more resources to invest.  Over time, the two sectors rebalance
themselves because in periods with relatively low output the intertemporal price of goods (the
real interest rate) is relatively high encouraging growth for the small sector.  The oscillatory
pattern of the long term dynamics of the model is a consequence of the mechanical two period
length of each project.  With longer lasting projects the dynamics will also last longer.
Moreover, if projects were of different length, the jagged oscillatory pattern would likely
                                                                




In environments where credit contracts are difficult to implement and where productive
processes take time to mature, entrepreneurs must find a different avenue to facilitate their
transactions.  The model presented in this paper has illustrated how money can fill this role.
Indeed, money can provide an important role in improving the timing of entrepreneurs'
transactions in periods where cash flows are restricted by projects not yet completed.
The model we have built combines tractability and a role of money in financing some of
the input in production without the "split family" device of Lucas (1980).  As a result, a monetary
injection in the model generates long lasting effects without having to assume ad-hoc costs of
adjusting money balances.  The source of these persistent effects is not only the wealth effects
present in the seminal contributions of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), but
also the shifts of productive resources across the various projects in the economy.  In the model,
these long lasting effects induce an oscillatory pattern in output and other real variables similar to
those of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984).  However, this unrealistic feature
could be remedied in more complicated models with different projects lasting different lengths of
time.22
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